McGeorge Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 22

7-1-1973

Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in
California
Nicholas G. Tinling
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nicholas G. Tinling, Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in California, 4 Pac. L. J. 880 (1973).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol4/iss2/22

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Newsman's Privilege: A Survey Of The
Law In California
Recent incidents of newsmen being imprisoned for refusing
to disclose confidential news sources before courts and grand juries
have focused attention on the conflict between the public need for
evidence and the public interest in a free press, unhampered by
governmental interference. The "newsman's privilege," i.e., a
privilege to refuse to disclose a confidential news source, is the
means for resolving this conflict. This comment examines the arguments for and against the need for a testimonial privilege, the existence and limits of common law and constitutional privileges, and
the Californiastatutory privilege afforded by Evidence Code Section
1070. The author concludes that, although there is no common
law privilege, the first amendment provides protection in limited
circumstances, and Section 1070, while vague in several respects,
appears to provide an unconditionalprivilege for certain newsmen.
In the summer of 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Branz-

burg v. Hayes' held that newsmen have no first amendment privilege
to refuse to testify or disclose news sources to a grand jury. This deci-

sion was a setback to many newsmen, legal scholars, and judges who
have argued that the first amendment provides, as a minimum, a
qualified privilege for the protection of the newsman-source relation2
ship.
In response to this and other recent decisions and to public opinion
over the recent jailing of disobedient newsmen, federal and state legislators have acted by proposing, adopting, and strengthening statutes which afford immunity to newsmen for refusing to disclose their

sources in specified circumstances. 3

California initially enacted a

1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 U. MicH. L. Rlv. 229 (1971); Guest
& Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64
Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969); But see Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958);
In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971); Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim
of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 O1n. L. REv. 243 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee, Jan. 16, 1973, §B, at 20, col. 1 (announcement of
congressional hearings to consider federal legislation for protection of newsmen's
confidential sources); Sacramento Bee, Jan. 11, 1973, §A, at 16, col. 1 (comment on
the introduction of three newsmen protection bills during the first two days of the
1973 Session of the California Assembly). For a list of the proposed legislation in
California, see note 146 infra.
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newsman's protection statute in 1935,4 but has broadened its coverage by statutory amendment in 1961, 1971, and again in 1972. 5 Since
enactment of the statute, there have been only a few reported cases in
which the privilege has been in issue, but when the issue has arisen, the
courts have shown a tendency to narrowly construe it." Court deci-

sions in other states with similar statutes have also shown a tendency to limit the scope of protection. 7 Furthermore, in 1971 a Cali-

fornia appellate court in Farr v. Superior Court" questioned the constitutionality of the statute.9
This comment will examine the claim that newsmen should be
afforded testimonial privilege, review the relevant decisions bearing
on the possible existence of a constitutional privilege, and determine
the extent of California statutory protection afforded newsmen under
the various circumstances in which they may be asked to testify.
CONTROVERSY OVER THE NEED FOR A NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE

Much has been written concerning the arguments for and against a
newsman's privilege.10 In order to understand the legal issues involved in the California statute, it is necessary to explore the basis and
rationale of those arguments.
A.

Need for Testimony

The acquisition of facts is essential to many governmental functions. Courts, in the performance of their judicial function, need the
testimony of witnesses so that the judge or jury can make intelligent
decisions." Grand juries need testimony for the purpose of investigating criminal activity and for insuring that probable cause exists before issuing an indictment. 12 Legislative bodies, in order to be ef4. CAL.
5. CAL.

STATS.
STATS.

1935, c. 532, at 1608.
1961, c. 629, at 1797;

CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1431.

CAL.

STATS.

1971, c. 1717, at 3658;

6. See Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
7. See, e.g., In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972); Branzburg
v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); State v. Donovan, 129 NJ.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
8. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
9. See text accompanying notes 121-130 infra.
10. See, e.g., Beaver, supra note 2; Guest & Stauzler, supra note 2; Blasi, supra
note 2; Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The ConstitutionalRight to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE LJ. 317 (1970); Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Government
Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198
(1970).
11. The use of witnesses has not always been considered essential to the administration of justice. At early common law, the witness, as he is known today, did not
exist. For a discussion of the history of the development of the use of witnesses, see
8 WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE §2190 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMoRE].
12. See generally Note, The California Grand Jury-Two Current Problems, 52
CALIF. L. Rnv. 116 (1964).
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fective, must obtain information concerning the need for legislation
and the conditions the legislation is intended to effect.1 3 In fact, it has
long been recognized that wherever the public has a need for information, it has a right to "everyman's evidence,"' 4 and to secure this
right, governmental bodies have either inherent or statutory power to
issue subpoenas and to hold a witness in contempt for failure to appear or refusal to testify."
Under this compulsion a witness must
testify unless he has some recognized privilege to refuse to testify.' 0
Certain privileges exist as a matter of common law, others are derived from the Constitution, and many privileges are statutory."' Concerning the granting of testimonial privileges in general, Wigmore
states:
The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial
duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges.
They should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.' 8
Whether a particular privilege is sufficiently in the public interest
to justify the obstacle it presents partially depends on the degree of
need for the testimony. It is difficult to generalize about the degree
of need in any particular proceeding.
Not only do the needs vary according to the type of proceeding
but the need also varies within the same type of proceeding depending
on whether there are alternate methods for obtaining the information,
the particular purpose for obtaining the information, and the relevance
between the information sought and the purpose of the proceeding.
Nevertheless, some writers argue that proceedings with judicial functions such as grand jury and court proceedings have a greater need
for testimony than legislative or administrative proceedings.' 0 This
proposition finds support in the fact that testimony is an essential and
primary part of the judicial function but, though it may be considered essential, is only incidental to the legislative or administrative
function. It is also argued that the need for testimony should be given
13.
14.
15.
§2195.
16.
17.
§2192.

18.

See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
WIGMORE, §2192.
See WrrKiN, C~A.Fon.Nu EVIDENCE, Witnesses §748 (2d ed. 1966); WIGMORII,
See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942).
For a detailed discussion of all forms of testimonial privileges, see WGMORE,

WIGMORE, §2192.
19. See generally Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 50-51; Reporters and
Their Sources, supra note 10, at 356; The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 10, at
1236-1248.
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less weight in civil trials than in criminal trials or grand jury proceedings. 20 The strong public interest in the prevention and punishment
of crime provides support for this distinction.
B.

The Effect of Compulsory Testimony on the Free Flow of News

Those who support the idea that newsmen should not have to reveal
their source of news argue that a confidential relationship between a
newsman and his source is essential to the free flow of news and
that the public interest in this free flow outweighs any detrimental
effect caused by granting a testimonial privilege to newsmen.2 1
This argument is premised upon the assumptions that (1) newsmen rely on the use of informants to obtain news, (2) a confidential
relationship between the newsman and his source is necessary to enable
the newsman to secure and maintain informants, and (3) requiring
22
newsmen to testify will destroy this confidential relationship.
It is generally recognized that newsmen rely on the use of confidential informants for the gathering of news.2 3 The extent to which
informants are used depends on several factors such as type of media,
experience of reporter, and type of assignment. 24 An extensive study
of the newsman-source relationship points out that the average newsman relies on confidential sources for between 22 and 34 percent of
his stories. 23 Approximately 12 percent of a newsman's stories come
from first-time sources, which are often the most important, and approximately 22 percent are the result of information supplied by regular informants (a source who has supplied information more than
twice).2 6 It is also noteworthy that of the various media, newsweeklies rely the heaviest on confidential sources-by a factor of greater
than 2 to 1 over local radio and television stations, the media which
27
use confidential sources the least.
Even though there is general agreement that newsmen do use and
rely on confidential informants, there is no general agreement on the
issue of whether the practice of requiring newsmen to testify and to
20. See generally Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 51; Reporters and Their
Sources, supra note 10, at 358-359; The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 10, at 12471248.
21. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1970); In re
Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963). See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, supra
note 2.
22. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
23. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 57; Blasi, supra note 2, at 247. See also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).
24. Blasi. supra note 2, at 245-253.
25. Id. at 247.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 249.
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reveal their sources will have any significant effect on their ability to
maintain present relationships and to secure future informants. 28 No
doubt it is difficult to quantitatively measure this effect. However, it
should be obvious that whenever a reporter is required to testify regarding
the identity of a confidential informant his relationship with that particular informant with regard to that particular news item is destroyed.
Therefore, the necessary inquiry should be directed to the determination
of the deterrent effect that the destruction of this relationship will have
on the future use of informants.

The relationship between a newsman and an informant is a tenuous
one. The informant, if his anonymity is essential to him, is normally
reluctant to reveal information until he feels that he can trust the reporter.

His only security is the newsman's promise of confidentiality.

The greater the informant's fear of disclosure, the more difficult is the
task of the newsman in developing the required trust. 20 The potential
informant may have fears that the newsman will voluntarily disclose
his identity. He may also fear that the newsman will, as part of the
news gathering and publishing process, be required to disclose to

others who may not be as reluctant as the newsman to reveal the
source's identity. 30 For example, publishers generally require newsmen to reveal the identity of their confidential sources as a condition
to publishing the information. 31 The informant may fear that the

publisher would respond differently to governmental pressure to testify
than would the newsman.3 2 Finally, in addition to all these fears,

the potential informant also fears the possibility that the newsman may,
under threat of contempt, be compelled to disclose his identity before a

governmental body. If the possibility of compelled disclosure increases
due to an increased frequency of issuing subpoenas, the fear of a po-

tential informant may become too great for a newsman to overcome
by a promise of confidence. 33
28. For arguments which discount the effect of compulsory testimony on the
free flow of news, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-694 (1972); In re
Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 302-303 (Mass. 1971); Beaver, supra note 2, at 251. For
arguments which contend that there is a significant effect see In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32.
193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963); Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 43; Reporters and Their
Sources, supra note 10, at 330-333; The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 10, at 1204.
29. See generally Blasi, supra note 2.
30. Id. at 244.
31. ld.
32. Id. at 269-270.
33. Disclosure under threat of contempt has an effect on both potential informants and the particular informant whose identity is disclosed. As pointed out by
Professor Blasi, over 20 percent of newsmen's stories are the result of information
supplied by regular informants. Blasi, supra note 2, at 247. It is likely that once an
informant has been disclosed, he would be very reluctant to act as an informant
again. Even if he were willing to act as an informant in the future, the fact that he
is now a known informant may prevent him from so acting.
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The issuing of subpoenas may also have a deterrent effect on the
seeking out of informants by newsmen. There is great pressure on the
newsman to honor his promise of confidence. Not only does his
code of ethics demand his silence,34 but his effectiveness in news reporting requires it. Confidential relationships are essential and reporters fear that the consequence of their disclosure will detrimentally
effect their careers."3 It seems logical to conclude that under this
pressure, a newsman may be reluctant to promise confidence if he
felt there was a substantial risk that he would be called to testify. The
greater the probability that he would be subpoenaed, the greater the
risk that he would be forced to choose between disclosure and a contempt citation.
Until at least a few years ago, the burden on the news gathering process caused by the issuance of subpoenas to the press was apparently
within acceptable limits. A 1971 study showed that although newsmen generally complained about the subpoenas and indicated that
they burdened the news-gathering process in many ways, less than
10 percent of the newsmen queried thought that their news coverage
had been adversely affected by the possibility of being subpoenaed.3 6
From the available evidence it seems that the press can operate as
long as the use of subpoenas remains within acceptable limits but
there may be serious burdens if it increases much beyond the frequency
of a few years ago.37
C.

Balancing the Competing Interests

Assuming that the press can tolerate some level of interference without unduly burdening the free flow of news, it becomes important to
examine the various circumstances in which a newsman may be asked
to testify so that the public's interest in obtaining testimony can be
balanced against the potential detrimental effect on the free flow of
news. It is beyond the scope of this comment to explore all of the types
34. The Code of Ethics of the American Newspaper Guild includes the following: "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigative bodies." G. BRD
& F. MEIVIN, THE NEWSPAPER AND SocIETY 567 (1942).
35. See Blasi, supra note 2, at 262-263.
36. Id. at 270.
37. To argue that newsmen feel no pressure or restraint in the present situation is to obscure the critical point: if the power to enforce compulsory
testimony were used to the full extent permissible there would be a serious
effect on the free flow of news. Newsmen at present are not called with
great frequency to testify to confidential sources because of "unwritten
understandings" with court officers, knowledge by attorneys that reporters
will not speak anyway and concern of public officials to maintain good relations with the press. (footnote omitted)
Guest & Stanzler, supra note 2, at 48.
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of proceedings in which testimony may be compelled. However, three
types of proceedings are frequently involved in this controversy: criminal trials, civil trials, and grand jury proceedings.88
1.

Criminal Trials

Even those who favor an absolute privilege for newsmen would
recognize an exception for criminal trialsm9 especially when a criminal
defendant seeks the testimony. 40 Because of favorable evidentiary
rules,4

the narrow scope of inquiry, 42 and the small number of

criminal trials in relation to civil litigation,43 there is only a small
possibility that a newsman will be asked to testify. 44 Hence, the balancing of this small potential deterrent effect on the news-gathering

process against the strong public interest in the fair administration of
justice and the regulation of crime should weigh in favor of the public's
need for testimony.
2.

Civil Trials

Because of broad and almost unlimited investigations which are permitted in discovery proceedings prior to civil trials, 45 there is an in-

creased danger of compulsory disclosure of the newsman's source of information. Also, there are considerably more civil trials than criminal
38. The proceedings which have created the most publicity and which would
appear to be the most significant for newsmen are court and grand jury proceedings.
Nevertheless, even though there are few reported cases in which a newsman has been
cited for contempt for refusing to testify before a legislative or administrative body,
these proceedings have significance because of their broad scope of inquiry. See Note,
The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel Testimony, 70 HARv. L. REv.
671 (1957).
39. See Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 10, at 346; The Newsman's
Privilege,supra note 10, at 1245.
40. See The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 10, at 1245.
41. For example, the hearsay rule, to a large extent, would prevent the disclosure of information about a criminal defendant which was received by the newsman from a third party informant. See generally 5 WioMoan, EvmENcn §1361
et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
42. A newsman would not be required to reveal the source of his information
unless it is relevant to the particular issues of the case. Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F.
Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Since the nature of inquiry is much narrower in a
criminal trial than in grand jury proceedings the government would be unable to use
the forum of the criminal trial to make "fishing expeditions" for information. Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 10, at 346.
43. For fiscal year 1969-70, the number of filings in California superior courts
for civil litigation was 150,638 compared to 72,048 for criminal trials. CALIFORNIA
JtIcrAL CouNcIL, ANNUAL REPORT at 102 (1971).
44. Since 1911 there have been 26 reported cases dealing with the issue of
whether or not a newsman is required to reveal his source of information. Annot,,
7 A.L.R.3d 591. Only two of these cases involved a criminal trial. Rosenberg v.
Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30
A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
45. See FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 26(b); CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§2016-2034. See
generally Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HIv.L. Rav. 940 (1961).
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trials, which increases the probability that a newsman would be asked

to testify.4"

The public interest in obtaining testimony in a civil trial

is not as strong as the interest in a criminal trial.4 7 When the interests
in a civil trial, the fair administration of justice, and the judicial solution
of private controversies are weighed against the potentially large
deterrent effect on the news-gathering process, the public's interest
in the free flow of news would appear to be favored.
3.

Grand Jury Proceedings

Of the three, the grand jury proceedings are capable of having the
most significant deterrent effect on the newsman's use of confidential
sources due to the broad scope of inquiry inherent in the investigative function of the grand jury.48 Furthermore, the rules of procedure and admissibility of evidence, which may serve to protect the

newsman in court trials, are almost nonexistent in grand jury proceedings. 49 Finally, grand jury proceedings are conducted in secrecy

and the mere fact that a newsman is subpoenaed and appears affects
the relationship with all of his regular sources even if the grand

jury investigation concerns none of them.

On the other hand, the

prevention and punishment of crime is a major concern of govern-

ment and the general public. Because of the strong public interest
associated with both of these competing interests, balancing is difficult
at best.

As a result, in the absence of a statute, the controversy

over the need for a newsman's privilege has focused on grand jury proceedings.
PROTECTION OF THE NEWSMAN-SOURCE RELATIONS-IP
IN THE _ABSENCE OF STATUTE

American courts have consistently held that a newsman enjoys no
common law privilege to refuse to disclose the source of his informa-

tion before a court, 50 grand jury,5 1 or legislature. 52

The first case in

46. See note 43 supra.
47. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
48. [The grand jury] is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation
and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly
by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly
subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of
the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally
are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
49. WrrxaN, CRIMINAL. PROCEDURE §11 (1963).
50. See, e.g., Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.C.
Mass. 1957); People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897).
51. See, e.g., Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
52. See Ex parteLawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897).
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which a newsman raised the issue that a privilege existed under the
freedom of press clause of the first amendment was Garlandv. Torre.55
In Garland,the plaintiff attempted to obtain the identity of an employee
of the defendant who had allegedly made a defamatory statement to reporter Torre. Torre refused to testify and was cited for contempt.
On appeal, Mr. Justice Stewart, then sitting on the Second Circuit,
held for the majority that even if the requiring of newsmen to testify
did involve a first amendment right, this right must give way to the interest of the fair administration of justice. The court qualified this
holding, however, by stating that the identity of the informant went
"to the heart of plaintiff's case" and was essential to the fair administration of justice.5 4 For several years after Garland, the courts consistently adhered to this holding.55
The issue of a first amendment privilege for newsmen did not reach
the United States Supreme Court until 1972 when three cases were heard
together; Branzburg v. Hayes, In re Pappas, and United States v.
Caldwell.56 In Branzburg a reporter had been subpoenaed by a Kentucky grand jury and asked to disclose the identity of drug users and
persons he viewed and photographed synthesizing hashish from marijuana. In Pappas a reporter had been subpoenaed by a Massachusetts
grand jury and asked to disclose the identity of persons and relate activities he observed while inside Black Panther Party headquarters during civil disorders in New Bedford in 1970. In Caldwell a reporter
had been subpoenaed by a federal grand jury and asked to testify and
turn over notes and tape recordings of interviews given him for publication by officers of the Black Panther Party concerning their aims,
purposes and activities.
In Branzburg and Pappas, the state appellate courts had affirmed
lower court refusals to quash the subpoenas. 57 However, in Caldwell,
the federal court of appeals reversed the district court's refusal to quash,
in what amounted to the first significant decision upholding the claim
of a first amendment privilege.55
The argument presented to the Supreme Court was based on the freedom of the press clause of the first amendment. It was contended
that requiring newsmen to reveal their confidential sources of informa53. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
54. Id. at 550.
55. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968); In re Taylor,
412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 F.2d
472 (1961).
56. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
57. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971); In re Pappas, 266 N.E,2d
297 (Mass. 1971).
58. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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tion to a grand jury would have a chilling effect on the news-gathering
process. 9 Further, it was argued that newsmen should not be forced
either to appear or to testify before a grand jury or at trial until
and unless sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the newsman possesses information relevant to a crime the grand jury is
investigating, the information the newsman has is unavailable from
other sources, and the need for information is sufficiently compelling
to override the invasion of first amendment rights. 60 In effect, the
reporters were claiming a qualified privilege to refuse to testify unless
a compelling need could be shown by the state.
In its decision, the Court distinguished between informants who
themselves were engaged in criminal conduct and informers who
were relating criminal conduct of others. 6 ' The claim of first amendment privilege for reporters who witnessed or had evidence of the
informer's criminal conduct was held to present no substantial federal
question. 2
In the situation where informers have information concerning criminal conduct of others, the Court expressed doubt as to the extent of the
burden on the news-gathering process which would result if reporters
were required to testify. 63 In response to the arguments that the burden would be excessive, the Court stated:
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law
enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is
insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden
on news-gathering which is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put them
in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 64
In a concurring opinion Justice Powell took a more moderate view than
the majority and expressed the opinion that newsmen are not precluded from claiming a first amendment privilege:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by
the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect
to criminal conduct. The balancing of these [interests] on a case59. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-680 (1972).

60. Id. at 680.
61. Id. at 691.
62. Id. at 692. Concerning this holding the Court stated:
The preference for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their desire to
escape criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is
hardly deserving of constitutional protection.
Id. at 691.
63. Id. at 693-695.
64. Id. at 690.
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by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions. 5
In essence, Justice Powell indicates that a proper balance can only be
obtained by weighing the competing interests under a particular set of
facts. 6
Limited to its facts, Branzburg stands for the proposition that
newsmen have no special constitutional privilege to refuse to testify before grand juries. However, the Court continually discussed the
overriding need for testimony relating to criminal conduct 7 and, as
illustrated by the majority opinion, its holding applied to grand jury
proceedings or criminal trials. There was no discussion of legislative or administrative proceedings or of civil trials, leaving unanswered the question of whether or not the Court would find a privilege in other types of proceedings.
After the decision in Branzburg, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Baker v. F & F Investment' s had occasion to
consider whether the need for testimony in civil trials overrode the
potential deterrent effect on the news-gathering process. The case
grew out of the following facts: In 1962 Alfred Balk wrote a story
for the Saturday Evening Post entitled "Confessions of a Blockbuster"."0
The story, which exposed details of racially discriminatory real estate
practices in the Chicago area, was based upon information supplied
to Mr. Balk by a confidential informant. In 1971, the plaintiffs in
the underlying case, a civil rights class action brought on behalf of all
Negroes in the City of Chicago who had purchased homes from approximately sixty named defendants between 1952 and 1969, sought
through discovery proceedings to obtain the identity of the informant
from Balk. He refused to disclose the identity and the plaintiffs brought
an action to compel disclosure, which was denied. 70 In affirming on
appeal, the court held that the facts of Garland v. Torre,71 in which
65. Id. at 710. Since Branzburg was a 5-4 decision, Justice Powell's concurring opinion, in those areas where it departs from the majority's opinion, is quite
significant.
66. See 408 U.S. at 710 n.*; Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d
Cir. 1972) (decided after Branzburg) where in dicta the court referred to Justice
Powell's concurring opinion and lent support to the proposition that even in criminal
proceedings a balancing test is applicable. But see In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460,
295 A.2d 3 (1972) (decided after Branzburg) in which a reporter was asked to testify
before a grand jury and refused to answer questions concerning the source of his
information. On appeal of a contempt citation the court stated: "We do not read the
majority opinion in Branzburg as requiring a balancing of the interests test to determine when a reporter should be compelled to testify." 295 A.2d at 6.
67. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-688 (1972).
68. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
69. Saturday Evening Post, July 14, 1962.
70. Baker v. F & F Investment, 339 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
71. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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the identity of the informant was essential to the libel action and
"cwent to the heart of plaintiff's case," could be distinguished since
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the identity of the informant
was necessary or critical.72 The Court also distinguished Branzburg
on the basis that it involved criminal activities, and the interest in
the investigation of crime by a grand jury had an overriding effect
on the consequential burden on news gathering. In Baker no such

overriding interest was shown.73
Although this case provides authority that a first amendment privilege exists in a civil action, the privilege is conditional. If, in the words
of Garland or Baker, the party asking for disclosure can demonstrate
that the identity goes to the heart of the case, the newsman may be

forced to disclose or risk a contempt citation.
Thus it would appear that newsmen have only a limited first amendment privilege to refuse to testify in civil trials, perhaps a limited
privilege in grand jury proceedings depending on the significance of
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, and likely no first amendment

privilege in criminal trials. Therefore, the extent of protection for a
newsman in California will depend, for the most part, upon the protection afforded by statute.
CALIFORNIA'S PROTECTION STATUTE

Newsmen protection statutes, sometimes referred to as "shield" statutes, have been enacted in several states. 74 California's statute was enacted in 1935 and has been amended several times to broaden the de-

scription of persons covered and the circumstances in which they are
protected.75

The statute is codified as Section 1070 of the Evidence

72. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972).
73. Id.
74. ALA. CODE tit.
7, §370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §09.25.150 (Supp. 1971);
Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-2237 (Supp. 1971-1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-917 (1964);
CAL. Evw. CODE §1070 (1972); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV.
STAT. §421.100 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-45:1454 (Supp. 1972); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, §2 (1971); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28.945(1) (1954); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §93-601-2 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §49.275 (1971); N.J. REv. STAT.
§§2A:84A-29 (Supp. 1972-1973); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §79-h (Supp. 1971-1972);
OHio REv. CODE ANN. §2739.12 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §330 (Supp. 19721973).
75. California's statute was originally enacted by adding a provision to Section
1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, at that time, contained five other relationships which enjoyed a testimonial privilege. CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 532, at 1608.
The statute was amended in 1961 to broaden its coverage to include radio and television news reporters. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 629, at 1797. In 1965 the statute was
repealed and re-enacted without change as Section 1070 of the Evidence Code. CAL.
STATS. 1965, c. 299, at 1297, 1335.
By amendment in 1971 the statute was again
broadened to provide protection to newsmen so employed at the time the news was
procured whereas before the statute applied only to newsmen so employed at the time
the immunity was invoked. Also, the 1971 amendment deleted wording that required
publication of the news obtained from the source before the statute was applicable.
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Code and in its present form reads:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, or by a press association or wire
service, or any person who has been so connected or employed,
cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined
in Section 901, the source of any information procured while so
connected or employed for publication in a newspaper.
Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any
person who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged
in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured while so connected or employed for news or news com06
mentary purposes on radio or television

Unlike statutes in several other states which provide only a conditional privilege, Section 1070 provides absolute immunity from
contempt despite recommendations by the California Law Revision
Commission that the newsman's privilege be amended to provide dis77
cretionary application by the courts.
A.

Constructionof the Statute
Since the enactment of this statutory protection there have been

several commentaries on problems construing the wording of the statute7 s and only three reported cases providing judicial interpretation. "
Amendments to the statute have cleared up some of the wording but

several interpretation problems still exist. In construing the wording
of the statute it is important to keep in mind that the courts have a
policy of strict and narrow construction of statutes which grant testimonial privileges.3 0
CAL. STAT. 1971, c. 1717, at 3658. In its most recent amendment the statute was
changed to broaden the definition of "proceeding" in which the protection is given.
CAL. STATS.

1972, c. 1431.

76. CAL. Evm. CoDE §1070.
77. 6 CAL. LAW REVIsION COMI'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES
207, 271 (1965). In the background study upon which the Commission relied for its
recommendation, it was pointed out that the statute, because it provided an absolute
immunity from contempt, could produce inequitable results when the public interest
in acquiring testimony outweighed the burden on the free flow of news. Id. at 508.
78. See Note, Work of the 1935 Legislature, 9 So. CAL. L. REv. 343 (1936);
Privilege of News Sources, Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Governmental Efficiency and Economy, Vol. 8, No. 6, at 23 (1959-1961); A California
Privilege Not Covered by the Uniform Rules Newsman's Privilege, 6 CAL. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STuuis 481 (1965); Newsmen's
Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 56 (1971).
79. Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Farr v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971); In re Howard, 136 Cal. App.
2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
80. Samish v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 695, 83 P.2d 305, 310 (1938).
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1.

Who is Given Protection

The statute provides protection for persons connected with or employed by a newspaper, press association, wire service, and radio or
television stations. This wording presents several interpretation problems
primarily because of the indefiniteness of the word "newspaper".
In common terms, a newspaper is a daily chronicle of current
events. As a legal term, however, the meaning can be quite different. In In re Green"' the court agreed that a newspaper was "[a]
printed publication issued in numbers at stated intervals conveying
intelligence of passing events."8 2 However, for the purpose of applying
the California retraction statute for libel,88 the court, in Morris v.
National Federation of the Blind,84 held that the word "newspaper"
' the distinction being that news
did not mean "magazine,"85
media which
must publish "news while it is news" are pressed for time and do not always have the opportunity for ascertaining complete accuracy.8 6 This
decision was used as authority for the federal court interpretation of
Section 1070 in Application of Cepeda17 that "newspaper" does not
include "magazine." The facts in Cepeda are similar to those in Garland v. Torre8 and in Baker v. F & F Investment 9 in that the plaintiff in Cepeda was attempting to take the deposition of a reporter for
evidence in a civil case. The court held that the newsman's status as
a reporter for the bi-weekly Look was not protected under the statute.
This decision ignores the underlying policy of providing protection to
newsmen, i.e., to promote the free flow of news.9 0 With that policy
in mind there is little reason to exclude magazine reporters from protection under the statute since they too are an important source of
news. Furthermore, the newsweekly class of magazine is the greatest
user of confidential sources of all the news media. 91
81. 21 Cal. App. 138, 131 P. 91 (1913).
82. Id. at 142, 131 P. at 93. The court derived this definition from Hanscom
v. Meyer, 60 Neb. 68, 82 N.W. 114 (1900).
83. CAL. Cirv. CODE §48a.
84. 192 Cal. App. 2d 162, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1961).
85. Id. at 165, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
86. Id.
87. 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Deltec v. Dun & Bradstreet,
187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
88. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
89. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
90. This decision also ignores the fact that the California statute only provides
immunity from contempt. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §2034 provides that as a consequence
of refusing to answer relevant questions in a discovery proceeding the court can issue
an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or the court, in extreme cases, could enter a default judgment
against the disobedient party. In Cepeda, the reporter refusing to testify was an
agent of the defendant in the libel action and the court could have found that the
immunity statute applied but still have compelled disclosure under threat of default
judgment.
91. See Blasi, supra note 2, at 249.
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On the other hand, the holding is consistent with the policy of
strict construction which has been applied by California courts to these
types of statutes. For example, in Samish v. Superior Court92 the court
stated: "Since the protection against privileged communications often leads to a suppression of the truth and the defeat of justice, the
tendency of the courts is toward a strict construction of such statutes."9 3
Also, in Tatkin v. Superior Court,94 the court stated: "Unless the statute expressly extends the privilege to specific persons or classes, the law
will not justify such individuals in refusing to disclose facts. . . which
would otherwise be competent evidence in a particular proceeding."9"
This holding appears consistent with the legislative intent. In
1959 the California Legislature passed a bill9" that would have extended
protection to almost all news media only to have it die by virtue of the
Governor's pocket veto. In view of the fact that this bill was widely
supported and had no apparent opposition,9 7 an assembly committee
conducted hearings and recommended that legislation be again introduced which would extend the privilege to all qualified news media.9 8
Pursuant to this recommendation, the 1961 amendment, as introduced,
would have extended coverage to magazines. However, in final form
the protection for magazines was deleted. 9 In view of this evidence it seems clear that the legislative intent was to limit the protection
to newspapers and the electronic media. 100
Even though the court in Cepeda held that Look was a magazine and
not covered by the statute and the legislature clearly intended
that the statute only afford protection to newspapers, there is yet no
clear definition of the term "newspaper" and how it is to be differentiated from printed publications of another class. For example, could
publications such as Time or Newsweek, which in every day language are called magazines, be considered newspapers for the purpose
of the statute? Unlike Look, these publications print current events
on a week-to-week basis. Could this difference be sufficient to distinguish Cepeda? The courts, when faced with the task of interpreting words in a statute, look both to the legislative intent and to the
92. 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 83 P.2d 305 (1938).
93. Id. at 695, 83 P.2d at 310.
94. 160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326 P.2d 201 (1958).
95. Id. at 753, 326 P.2d at 206 (emphasis added).
96. S.B. 1126, 1959 Regular Session.
97. Report of the Assembly Interim Committee, supra note 78, at 23.
98. Id.
99. Compare CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 629, at 1797, with A.B. 65, 1961 Regular
Session.
100. Two bills introduced in the 1973 Session of the California Assembly would
provide protection to any person gathering news for the "communication media."
A.B. 1, 1973 Regular Session; A.B. 4, 1973 Regular Session, as amended, Feb. 9, 1973.
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purpose for the statute. There is nothing to indicate what the legislature intended by the word "newspaper," but to be consistent with the
underlying purpose, it is suggested that "newspaper" should be interpreted as any periodically printed publication which disseminates news
and intelligence of a general character, i.e., of general interest to
the public. 0 1 However, this does not mean that the classification should
depend on circulation or upon the general theme of the publication.
Unlike statutes in other states there are no words in the California statute which would be construed as a limitation as to type of newspaper
or its circulation. 102 Furthermore, the small limited circulation newspaper may be more of an adversary of vested interests than the media
of general circulation and therefore more willing to dethrone popular
heroes.' 03 As stated by one author:
It must be axiomatic that hardly any of the publications which are
deemed "successful" by commercial standards strike anything like
an adversary stance towards business, toward higher education (except when students are rioting), toward big labor, toward the
church, and all other pivotal institutions . . . .Like the Communists, who will not question the basic structures of their society,
American journalists approach every institution gingerly, and with
notable deference . . . . There is some hope for a wide-ranging
adversary journalism, however. It is evident in the birth of
the many little weeklies, bi-weeklies, and monthlies which have
sprung up in several states .... 104
If Section 1070 is construed to provide protection to distinguishable
classes of newsmen such as newsmen employed by "newspapers of general circulation,"' 0 5 then it might be argued that the statute is unconstitutional because it is a denial of equal protection of the law under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. If the
classification infringes upon a fundamental right, the state is required
to show a compelling interest for the classification. 0 6 However, since
Branzburg held that there is no absolute first amendment right
for a newsman to refuse to testify, the statutory immunity from con101. See generally In re David, 98 Cal. App. 69, 276 P. 419 (1929); In re Simpson,
62 Cal. App. 549, 217 P. 789 (1923).
102. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 §330, where the statute gives protection to
"newspapers of general circulation as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth."
103. See generally W. RrvnEs, THE AvEu RSMEs 200-236 (1970).
104. Id. at 202-203.
105. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6000, defines a "newspaper of general circulation" as a
newspaper published for the dissemination of local or telegraphic news and intelligence
of a general character, which has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers,
and has been established, printed and published at regular intervals in the State,
county, or city where publication, notice by publication, or official advertising is to
be given or made for at least one year preceding the date of the publication, notice
or adverstisement.
106. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4

tempt is an extension of a right to newsmen and the denial of that
protection to a class of persons does not, therefore, infringe on a fundamental right 107 Consequently, the classification of newsmen would
survive an equal protection argument as long as there is a valid legislative objective and the method used is reasonable for accomplishing that
objective.10 8 Since the objective of the statute is to promote the
free flow of news, it may be argued that this objective is met
by extending protection to a media which is traditionally responsible for the dissemination of day-to-day events, i.e., "newspapers of
general circulation".
On the other hand, any classification which on its face, or perhaps
in effect, would discriminate in favor of a class on the basis of the news
content would, according to the holding in Chicago Police Department v. Mosley,10 9 require a showing of a compelling state interest.
In Mosley a statute banned all picketing near a school building while
the school was in session except the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute."10 Although the state may have constitutionally been able to regulate the picketing of a school under these
circumstances, the Court struck down the statute as being in violation
of the equal protection clause because the discrimination among picketers was based on the content of their expression and thus infringed
on a fundamental right."' On the basis of this holding, Section 1070
may be unconstitutional unless protection is extended to all publications which disseminate intelligence because, arguably, the inevitable
effect of any classification would be a discrimination on the basis of
news content (news content being analogous to content of expression of
picketers in Mosley). This is because different classes of publications
are often designed for the tastes of different classes of persons and
therefore often have different themes, i.e., different types of news content. An extreme example would be a Hollywood gossip magazine.
This type of publication often contains information which can be
found in no other type of publication. If protection is denied them
on the basis that they are magazines and not newspapers, the inevitable
effect is a discrimination on the basis of news content.
2. ProceedingsWhere Protectionis Given
Prior to the 1972 amendment, Section 1070 provided that newsmen could not be adjudged in contempt by a court, the legislature, or
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Id.
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 102.
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any administrative body. The statute now provides immunity from
contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other
body having the power to issue subpoenas112 where the refusal to discan be compelled
close occurs in any proceeding in which testimony
3
as defined in Section 901 of the Evidence Code."
3.

Information Which May be Withheld

Section 1070 provides immunity from contempt for refusal to disclose the source of any information procurred for publication or news
commentary purposes. The italicized phrase is identical or similar
to the provisions in other state statutes"' 4 and has been interpreted differently by different courts." 5 The Pennsylvania statute was construed
in In re Taylor 16 and the phrase was interpreted to include not only the
identity of the person who disclosed information to the newsman, but
the information itself. 1 7 In State v.Donovan,1 8 a New Jersey case,
and Branzburg v. Pound," 9 a Kentucky case, the courts gave the
identical phrase a more limited interpretation and held that newsmen could only refuse to disclose the identity of the person who disclosed the information. In fact, in Branzburg v. Pound the court
held that a newsman could not refuse to disclose criminal activity he
observed when that criminal activity was conducted by the informant.
It was termed a case where the informant was informing on himself.
If the statute is to be construed in a fashion that supports the underlying purpose for the immunity, it should be interpreted in a manner
that would allow the newsman to refuse to answer any question which
is involved in the confidential relationship, such as the identity of the informant, the method by which the informant obtained the information, or a portion of the information transferred if all of it was not intended for publication. Basically, the purpose is to maintain the confidential relationship and the newsman should be able to refuse to
answer any question which would impair that relationship.' 20 How112. A court has inherent power to compel the attendance of witnesses in an
action or proceeding before it. By statute, the legislature and many administrative
bodies and officers have power to subpoena witnesses. See WrIN, CALIFORNIA
EViDENCE, Witnesses §748 (2d ed. 1966).
113. CAL. Evm. CODE §901 defines proceeding as any action authorized by law,
pursuant to which testimony can be compelled.
114. D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources
of Information, 6 HAnv.J. LEGIS. 307 (1969).
115. ld. at 332.
116. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
117. 193 A.2d at 184; criticized in Note, 39 NoTmn DAME LAW. 489 (1964).
118. 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
119. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971).
120. But cf. Note, An Act to Protect Confidential Sources of News Media, 6
HAnv.J.Lois. 341 (1969).
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ever, again relying on the policy of strict construction, a court could
sustain the argument that "the source of any information" refers only
to the identity of the informant.
B.

Circumstancesin Which ProtectionMay be Denied
1.

Waiver of Immunity

As with other testimonial privileges, a newsman may expressly or
impliedly waive his right to claim immunity. In general, one may be
deemed to have waived his testimonial privilege when he has disclosed
to others the privileged information or when he has introduced evidence which discloses the facts claimed to be privileged. 1 ' Also, the
courts have shown a great reluctance to allow a newsman-defendant in
a libel action to claim immunity from disclosure on the basis of a
newsman's privilege; the newsman will be deemed to have waived
his privilege if he raises any defense to the libel action which can be
rebutted by disclosure of this source of information.' 22 In California, a newsman-defendant in a libel action is not protected by Section
1070 because it only provides immunity from contempt, thus other
methods of compelling testimony are available.'
A reporter often discloses his source to his editor or even to competing newsmen.'2 4 Disclosing to editors is generally required before
publication will be allowed. 1 25 The disclosure to competitors is often
done for the purpose of verification of the validity of the news.120
This limited disclosure should not be considered a waiver under the
general rule as it is an essential part of the news-gathering process.
One of the few California cases interpreting Section 1070 dealt with
waiver.' 2 7 It involved a newspaper story about a speech given by a
named labor leader. Quotation marks were used within the article on
certain phrases which were of importance in a labor dispute. One
litigant claimed that the use of quotation marks constituted a waiver
by identifying the person who gave the speech as the person quoted
and thus identifying him as the source. The court held that someone
other than the speech maker could have been the source of the information and therefore the reporter did not waive his protection un121. See In re Visaxis, 95 Cal. App. 617, 273 P. 165 (1929).
122. See Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269,
197 A.2d 416 (1964); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473
(1956).
123. See note 90 supra.
124. Blasi, supra note 2, at 244.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 246.
127. In re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
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der the statute.' 28
2.

Denial of Immunity in Circumstances Where Information
is Vital to a CriminalDefendant

The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution grants the
criminal defendant the right to subpoena witnesses in his favor.
Wigmore points out that this right was established merely to give the defendant the same right that the prosecution had by common law and
that as a consequence the right does not override testimonial privileges recognized by common law or statute. 1 29 However, as pointed
out earlier, the potential deterrent effect on the use of confidential
130
sources by requiring newsmen to testify in criminal trials is not great.
Also, public opinion, including that of newsmen,' 3 ' would most
likely be in favor of affording the criminal defendant an overriding
need to show his innocence. However, the present wording of the
statute is clear, and absent any constitutional infirmities it would appear that a reporter could invoke the privilege at a criminal trial.
3.

Denialof Immunity in CircumstancesWhere Testimony
is Necessary to Conduct a Fairand ImpartialTrial

The holding in Farr v. Superior Court 3 2 indicates that under certain
circumstances the application of Section 1070 would be an unconstitutional interference with the judiciary. 38 The facts and circumstances which led to Farr are as follows: Early in the proceedings
of the Charles Manson murder case, the superior court issued an Order
re Publicity. That order prohibited any attorney, court employee, attache, or witness from releasing for public dissemination the content
or nature of any testimony that might be given at trial or any evidence
the admissibility of which might have to be determined by the court.
Subsequent to the issuance of this order and while the trial was in progress, reporter Farr obtained copies, which he admitted were supplied
by attorneys who were under the publicity order, of a written statement
of one of the defense witnesses containing information, highly inflam128.

Id. at 819, 289 P.2d at 538.

129. WiGMoRE §2191. See In re Baker Mutual Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 21, 92 N.E.2d
49, 52 (1950) ("But persons subpoenaed may nevertheless assert against the compulsion of such process whatever privileges they may enjoy under the common law or by
statute").
130. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
131. As pointed out by Blasi, supra note 2 at 258, a large percentage of newsmen
would volunteer information in derogation of their code of ethics to help a criminal
defendant.
132. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
133. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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atory in nature, 8 4 and potentially damaging to the defendants in the
trial. The written statements were subsequently published.
After the trial, the court convened a hearing to determine whether
there had been a violation of the Order re Publicity. Farr was called
as a witness to this hearing and asked to disclose the identity of the
persons. Farr refused, claiming immunity under Section 1070. He
was cited for contempt and ordered jailed until he answered the questions. 18 5 On appeal of this contempt citation, the court pointed out
that the inquiry conducted by the trial court was necessary to perfect a
record pertaining to an issue likely to arise on appeal of the Manson case; that is, if the members of the prosecution team leaked the
information, the issue of the prejudicial nature of that information
would merit serious consideration on appeal. If the defense leaked
the information, then the issue is materially different. 13 6 The court also
argued that the disclosure was necessary in order to comply with the
United States Supreme Court's mandate that trial courts take affirmative action to control prejudicial publicity emanating from officers of
the court. 13 7 The court pointed out that reporter Farr was the only
person who could disclose the identity of the persons who violated the
Order re Publicity and therefore disclosure by him was necessary to its
duty to control its own officers appearing before it.'8 8 Further, since
disclosure was necessary in order for control of the officers of the
court, Farr could not be granted immunity from contempt for refusing
to testify. Although the statute, by its broad terms, clearly applied,
the court held that the legislature could not have intended it, for if
they had it would have been an unconstitutional interference with
the court's inherent and vital power to control its own proceedings. 8 9 If disclosure by Farr is the only method by which the
court can enforce its order, then certainly Farr's refusal interferes with
the court in the discharge of its duties. Under this reasoning, however, any refusal of a question posed by the court, unless constitution134. Among other things, the statement related plans by the Manson "family" to
cross the country and murder people at random, including plans to murder a series
of show business personalities; Elizabeth Taylor's eyes were to be removed and mailed
to her ex-husband; Richard Burton was to be castrated; Frank Sinatra was to be
skinned alive while hanging from a meathook; and Tom Jones was to have his throat
cut while he was engaged in sexual intercourse with Susan Atkins, one of the de-

fendants. Id. at 64, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
135. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
136. Id. The court does not cite its reasons as to why this would make any
difference. However, if the prosecution was responsible for the disclosure then the
issue on appeal may concern the fairness of the trial as opposed to the issue of adequacy of council if the defense is responsible for disclosing the information.
137. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
138.

22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.

139. Id. at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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ally protected, would be considered an obstruction of the court in the
discharge of its duties. This would be a ludicrous conclusion in light
of many other accepted testimonial privileges unless it could be distinguished on the basis of the purpose for acquiring the information.
The purpose in Fafr was to obtain information which would allow the
court to punish the persons who had violated the court order. Certainly those persons could not be immune from contempt because they
were officers of the court. Although Farr was not under the publicity order, his conduct in publishing the information with knowledge
of its inadmissibility into evidence, its inflamatory character, and with
knowledge that a publicity order existed, might be considered contemptuous. 140 However, his refusal to disclose was based on a legislative act which granted him immunity and should not be considered
an unconstitutional interference with the judiciary's right to control
its own proceedings.
CONCLUSION

The California Evidence Code Section 1070 provides virtually
an absolute privilege for newsmen to refuse to testify before any
government body. 141 However, the statute is subject to several different
interpretations and therefore is presently uncertain as to the kinds of questions which newsmen can refuse to answer, 14 2 the particular newsmen
who are given protection,' 43 and the acts which would constitute
waiver.

1 44

In view of the purpose of the statute, i.e., to promote the free flow of
news, it is suggested that the statute be amended to clarify these uncertainties and to provide broad protection for all bona fide newsmen, whether associated with newspapers or magazines, with general circulation or with limited circulation. It is also recommended that the
statute be amended to more clearly define the information which is
privileged and include protection for any information which would
insure the confidentiality of the newsman-source relationship.
The legislature is also urged to recognize that the public interest
may be better served if newsmen were denied the protection in criminal trials. As pointed out herein, the government cannot use the
140. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
141. It should be noted that a California newsman will not be protected by the
statute when appearing before federal courts, grand juries, or before other federal
bodies. An exception may occur in the case of diversity suits. See Application of
Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), where a federal district court in New York
applied the California statute for a case which came to trial in California.
142. See text accompanying notes 114-120 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 81-111 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 121-128 supra.
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forum of the criminal trial to take advantage of the investigative work
of the newsman 45 and the burden on the news-gathering process would
be slight compared to the public interest in the administration of justice

in a criminal trial. 14 6
Nicholas G. Tinling
145. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
146. At the time of this writing several bills have been introduced in the 1973
Regular Session of the California Assembly which would broaden the protection of
the newsman-source relationship. A.B. Nos. 1, 4, 26, 75, and 84, 1973 Regular Session. In addition, two constitutional amendments have been proposed. A.C.A. 2,
1973 Regular Session; A.C.A. 9, 1973 Regular Session.
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